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In the preceding chapter we tested theories of the first merger wave
set in the context of historical development, passing over the role
of short-run cyclical changes. It was apparent, however, that the
business cycle was important in the timing of the first merger
movement. Revival of merger activity did not occur until the de-
pressed conditions of the mid-1890's had passed and the prosperous
turn-of-the-century years were reached. Also, the merger expansion
occurred during a cyclically rising stock market. The infrequency
of merger movements indicates that they have not sprung up with
every business expansion. However there are several ways in which
merger activity might be expected to respond to business cycles.
The acquisition of one firm by another or the consolidation of
several firms into one is an act of investment by the initiator of
the merger, in many respects the same as other forms of invest-
ment. The calculation made by the entrepreneur in balancing the
cost of the to-be-acquired firms with the future earnings ability
of the merged firm is the same type of calculation he makes in
deciding to build another plant, or to organize a new business.
Merger activity, viewed as a form of private investment, might be
expected to respond, as private investment has been shown by
various studies to respond, in a positive and sensitive fashion to the
business cycle.'
A merger may represent more than an act of pure investment,
however. The merged firm may gain greater control over its market
and enhanced ability to raise prices, control production, and other-
wise exploit the market. The profits of such market control are of
course all the greater if the market is expanding. We might thus
expect attempts at mergers for market control to occur early in a
cyclical expansion, when expectations become favorable. The ex-
pectations of the prospective acquirees would also become favor-
able,2 however, and their unwillingness to sell out at a sufficiently
1Fora summary of the sensitivity and conformity of investment activity to the business
cycle, see Wesley C. Mitchell, WhatHappensDuring Business Cycles: A Progress Report,
National Bureau of Economic Research, 1951, Table 16, Sections B, C, D, pp. 161—163.
2Theoreticallythe acquiree could hold out for a price that would represent a little less
than the discounted value of the difference in the profits of the merged and unmerged
acquirer. Moreover, if the would-be acquirer is a leading firm in the industry, the acquiree
might decide it would be more profitable to stay out of the merger, and let the big firm
set a price at which the small firm could sell all of his output, rather than his
pro-rata share of the monopoly output of the merged firm. See George J. Stigler,
"Monopoly and Oligopoly by Merger," Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic
Association, May 1950, pp. 23—25.
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low price might prevent such mergers. The desire for merger may
be less urgent if the various firms are operating at less than full
capacity, and independent, immediate, and profitable expansion
may be possible. The merger may be accomplished only when the
expansion of the various firms has proceeded to a point at which
they are operating at capacity. The opportunity for immediate
increase in capacity, coupled with the advantages of market con-
trol, may cause the initiator of the merger to offer a premium price
to a solicited firm. Such firms may also have reached a receptive
mood, if profits can no longer be increased quickly through inter-
nal expansion. We might thus expect to find merger activity occur-
ring at the stage in a cyclical expansion when many industries have
reached capacity production.
The condition of the capital market may also affect the -time
pattern of mergers. Firms expanding by merger, as in other forms
of firm growth, frequently turn to public sources for the needed
extra funds. New capital issues are most common when the
acquired firms are purchased for cash; but when the purchase is
made by exchange of stock, new securities are frequently issued
to increase working capital. Even when a pure stock-for-stock trans-
action is made, the organizers of the merger are sensitive to the
recent trend of the stock market, because ratios of exchange are
partly determined by the market prices of the securities of the
merging firms. We might expect to find mergers occurring—as
with other aspects of corporate financing—when the recent history
of stock prices has indicated a strong tendency toward further in-
crease. This is usually some time after the initial faltering stages
of stock price recovery, and during a time when the market has
exhibited a sustained upward movement. As the end of the expan-
sion is ordinarily not anticipated, merges may occur when stock
prices are on the verge of moving downward.
The interval required to conceive, plan, and execute a merger
is a complicating factor in the response of mergers to the business
cycle. Whether this time lag is longer than that found in the
ordinary investment action is open to question. Unlike an ordinary
act of investment, the merger requires initial steps that are likely
to be complex and time consuming. Permission may have to be
obtained from stockholders, minority objections settled, and
authorization for corporate charter changes obtained from state
commissions or courts. Once arranged, however, the transfer of
control may be carried out rapidly, for the "new plant" is already
a fully operating business. The construction of a new plant—a type
of investment that is quickly arranged—may take a considerable
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period of time. If future earnings expectations are assumed to be
calculated from the date the enlarged facilities go into operation,
the time response of merger "investment spending" may be actu-
ally shorter than that of ordinary investment spending.
In the light of the interplay of these factors and circumstances,
we might expect to find merger activity at its highest in the expan-
sion phase of the business cycle. The peak of merger activity is not
likely to occur very early in the expansion, but just how far the
expansion must advance before the merger peak is reached is not
clear. Since stock market conditions reflect general business expec-
tations,3 and in turn directly affect the launching of mergers, it
seems likely that the response of merger activity to economic con-
ditions would resemble the response of new business formation.
Merger activity thus might correspond quite closely to changes in
the number of business incorporations.
With the new 1895—1920 series of mergers and the comprehen-
sive series dating from 1919 through 1954, the stage is set for exam-
ining the behavior of merger activity over a number of cycles of
business activity. This six-decade period encompasses allthe
large waves and all but one of the minor flurries of merger activity
in manufacturing and mining. A minor merger wave occurred in
1888—1892, but it was so small that its exclusion will not seriously
weaken the tests.
The successive sections of the various merger series, though
differing from one another in a number of ways, have one measure
of merger activity common to all—the number of firm disappear-
ances by merger. Accordingly, this is the measure used in the
analyses below. A visual comparison of merger disappearances and
the business cycle is presented in Chart 5. The chart also contains
quarterly series of industrial production and stock prices to be
used later in the chapter.'
The merger activity of the past six decades has exhibited high,
though not perfect, conformity to changes in general business con-
ditions (Table 55). The National Bureau of Economic Research
has recorded fourteen cycles ingeneralbusiness activity between
1897 and 1954. The series of merger disappearances exhibited
welve cycles of activity.5 Eleven of the twelve merger cycles showed
For a discussion of the relationship between expectations and stock prices, see "An
Appraisal of Data and Research on Businessmen's Expectation," Report of Consultant
Committeeon General Business Expectciions to the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Joint Committee of the Economic Report, September 1955, pp. 119—128. -
'Fora detailed description of the various merger series, see Chapter 3.
5Iam indebted to Victor Zarnowitz of the National Bureau for much thoughtful
advice on the treatment of the cyclical relationships.
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TABLE 55
Relationship between Reference Cycles and Merger Cycles, 1897—1954
Rank in Amplitude and Duration




Turning Reference Mergeror Lag (+)Ampli-Dura- Ampli-Dura-
Point cycle cycle in tude lion tude lion
Trough II '97 III '96 —3
Peak III '99 iii '99 0 5 7
TroughIV '00II '00 —2 10.5 7.5
Peak IV '02 IV '01 —4 13 8.5
TroughIII '04 III '04 0 10.5 3
Peak II '07 III '05 —7 8 6
Trough II '08I '09 +3 5 11
Peak 1 '10I'lO 0 6 10.5
TroughIV'll 13 3
Peak I '13 14 13
Trough IV'14II'14 —2 6 3
Peak III'18I'17 —6 4 3
Trough II '19 IV '18 —2 7 13.5
Peak I '20 I '20 II ('20)a0 1) 9 14
TroughIII '21 4 5
Peak II '23 3 10.5
TroughIII '24 III '23 —4 8 7.5
Peak III '261 '26 —2 10
TroughIV '27I '27 —3 14 7.5
Peak II'29I'29 —1 11 12
Trough I '33 IV '33 +3 1 1
Peak II '371 '36 —5 2 2
TroughII'38 111739 +5 2 11
Peak II '40 1 1
Trough III '42
Peak I'45II'44 —3
TroughIV '45II '45 —2 3 13.5
Peak IV'4811746 —10 12 5
TroughIV '49II '49 —2 9 11
Peak II '53 7 4
Trough III '54 12 7.5
TIMING SEQUENCE, MERGER CYCLES RELATIVE TO REFERENCE CYCLES
Pea/cs Troughs
Number of leads 8 8
Number of coincidences 2 1
Number of lags 1 3
Average lead (—)orlag (+) in quarters —34 —0.8
a Figures in ps.rentheses show second segment of the acne,, included in count and averages.
Source: Reference cycle chronology for 1897—1919 is from Geoffrey H. Moore, Statistical Indicators of Cyclical
Revivals and Recessions, Occasional Paper SI, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1950, p. 6, Table I;
for later years from Standard Reference Dales for Business Cycles, United States, 1919—1954 (NSER,miineo-
graphed)
Merger turning points were dated by the business cycle staff of she Nasa.Themerger series was deseasonal-
ized in the UNIVACprogram,and the deseasonalized series was used in dating the turning points. Amplitude
measures were derived from NRERworksheets,and were based on the American Telephone and Telegraph,
Persons, and Ayrcs indexes of business cycles. A low rank number signifies that the given expansion or con-
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a definite timing relationship to the turning points of reference
cycles.
The reference cycle phases skipped over by the merger series
were usually either of short duration or of moderate amplitude.
There were two reference expansions for which there was no
corresponding merger expansion, 1911—1913 and 1921—1923. These
were among the shortest of the fourteen reference cycle expansions
of the period, and the 1911—1913 expansion was among the mildest
of the reference expansions.
The expansion of 1921—1923 was vigorous, however, and it is
not clear why merger activity did not respond. A possible explana-
tion is the relative shortness of the expansion (7 quarters as against
an average expansion period of 10.7 quarters). Another explanation
might be that the sharp revival of industrial production was not
matched by an equally sharp rise in stock prices (Chart 5). The
absence of merger revival may thus signify that the rise in produc-
tion might not have been accompanied by an equally strong in.
crease in business optimism as reflected in stock prices.
There was one reference cycle contraction that had no corre-
sponding merger contraction—1953--1954, one of the mildest con-
tractions in the six-decade period. One merger contraction had no
corresponding reference cycle contraction—that of 1940—1942.
This downturn in mergers accompanied a downturn in stock prices,
even though general business conditions and industrial produc-
tion were expanding.6
The response of merger activity to business conditions from 1933
through 1945 suggests possible additional factors required for the
revival of merger activity. The economic expansion of 1933—1937,
while large and protracted, did not result in the restoration of the
high production levels of the late 1920's, nor was there a substan-
tial increase in merger activity. It was not until the greater expan.
sion of 1938—1945, especially after the wartime expansion following
1941, that merger activity rose substantially above the low levels
of the 1930's. This suggests that the reappearance of merger
activity may require not simply a cyclical expansion but one that
has attained a substantial recovery of employment and production.
Peaks of merger activity most commonly preceded the peaks of
the reference cycle. The average merger lead for the eleven peaks
common to both cycles was 3.4 quarters. The longest leads, with
the exception of the 1901 secondary peak on the huge wave,
occurred in times of generally low merger activity. The high
merger peak of 1899 coincided with the reference cycle peak, while
6SeeTable 56.
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that of 1929 led the reference peak by only one quarter. Near-
coincidence in timing also characterized the sharp, though lesser,
peak of 1920. This suggests that the periods of extremely high
merger activity may be more prolonged than periods of more
restrained merger activity.
The time sequence for troughs was somewhat less consistent than
that for peaks. Merger troughs preceded reference troughs, on the
average, by only 0.8 quarters, and lagged them on three occasions.
This irregular time sequence probably indicates that economic
forces in a depression are likely to be diffuse and weak, compelling
no great uniformity in the response of merger activity.
TIME SEQUENCE OF MERGER-RELATED CYCLES
The general business cycle is a composite of many economic
series. The cyclical time pattern of each of the various series is to
some degree unique, and the patterns differ, among other ways,
in the timing of their turning points. For many series this timing
pattern is consistently related to that of other series and to that of
the general business cycle. Some series experience turning points
that precede those of most other series, while others coincide with
or follow the majority of turning points.
We shall examine the time sequence of the merger cycle relative
to other cycles, to determine whether a consistent sequence exists
between mergers and other presumably related series. Five series
will be compared: the reference cycle; industrial stock prices; the
volume of stock trading; business incorporations; and industrial
production. They were chosen because of indications, discussed
earlier, that they are representative of forces likely to be related to
mergers, and because requisite data were available. Such factors
as cycles in technological innovation and in industrial reorganiza-
tion were not included because they were not reducible to quanti-
tative form.
The turning points in the merger series were in quarterly form.
For use with the other series, they were converted into monthly
form by taking as the turning point the center month of the appro-
priate quarter. The monthly turning points for merger activity
and related series are shown in Table 56.
Comparison of the turning point dates of the reference cycle
and of cycles in specific series suggests a consistent sequence of
events (Table 57). The pattern is different for peaks and troughs.
In expansions the peak in stock trading is reached first, followed
by merger activity, stock prices, business incorporations, the refer-
ence cycle, and industrial production, in that order. In contractions
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TABLE 56
Cyclical Turning Points of Merger Series and Five Related Series, 1896—1954
MonLiz and 2'ear ofTurning Point
Merger Referenceindustrial Stock Stock
cycle cycle production prices tradingincorporations
Trough 8/96 6/97 9/96 ... 5/979/96
Peak ... ... ... ... ... 9/97
Trough ... ... ... .•. ... 5/98
Peak 8/99 6/99 2/00 9/99 1/99 7/99
Trough 5/00 12/00 10/00 9/10 8/002/00
Peak 11/01 9/02 7/03 6/01 5/01 5/01
Trough ... ... ... ... ... 9/01
Peak ... ... ... ... ... 2/03
Trough 8/04 8/04 12/03 11/03 5/044/04
Peak 8/05 5/07 5/07 1/06 1/06 1/07
2/09 6/08 5/08 11/07 11/0712/07
Peak 2/10 1/10 3/10 11/09 6/09 11/09
Trough ... 1/12 1/11 7/10 4/11 7/10
Peak ... 1/13 1/13 9/12 9/11 7/12
Trough 5/14 12/14 11/14 12/14 12/1412/14
Peak 2/17 8/18 5/17 11/16 9/16 1/17
Trough 11/18 4/19 3/19 12/17 4/1811/18 (9/18)2
Peak 2/20 (5/20) 1/20 2/20 10/19 7/1912/19
Trough ... 7/21 7/21 8/21 10/21 1/21
Peak ... 5/23 6/23 3/23 2/234/23
Trough 8/23 7/24 7/24 10/23 10/238/24 (6/24)
Peak 2/26 10/26 3/27 ... 11/2510/25
Trough 2/27 11/27 11/27 ... 5/2612/26
Peak 2/29 6/29 8/29 9/29 10/29 1/29
Trough 11/33 3/33 7/32 6/32 3/33 ...
Peak ... ... ... 2/34 7/33 ...
Trough ... ... ... 9/34 3/3512/34 (12/34)
Peak 2/36 5/37 7/37 2/37 2/3612/36
Trough 8/39 6/38 5/38 4/38 ... 9/39
Peak 5/40 ... ... 10/39 ... 4/40
Trough 5/42 ... ... 4/42 5/425/42
Peak 5/44 2/45 11/43 5/46 ... 4/46
Trough 5/45 10/45 2/46 ... ... ...
Peak 5/46 11/48 10/48 ... 1/46 ...
Trough 5/49 10/49 10/49 6/49 1/494/49
Peak ... 7/53 7/53 1/53 1/515/50
Trough .. 8/54 8/54 9/53 8/526/51
a Dates in parentheses are beginning turning points in the more recent of overlapping
series, and are used in making timing comparisons.
Sources: Turning-point dates of reference cycle, stock prices, and stock trading were
taken from business cycle files of the National Bureau of Economic Research. Industrial
production series used are the Babson index from 1896 to 1917, and the Federal Reserve
Board index from 1919 to 1954, both deseasonalized, and dated by the NEER. Iricorpora-
dons turning points for 1896—1940 were taken from George H. Evans, Jr., Business
incorporations in the United States, 1800—1943, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1948,
p. 85, Table 41; for 1942—195 1 the turning points are those of Dun's series for forty-eight
states. The merger series was deseasonalized and dated by the NBER businesscycleunit;
this quarterly series was converted to monthly by taking the center month of the turning
point of the quarterly series as the monthly turning point.
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TABLE 57
Timing of Turning Points in Merger Activity, Stock Trading, Stock Prices, Business









Number of shares sold,
New York Stock Exchange — 10.5 —6.3 7.0 3.4
Merger activity —7.6 —3.9 8.4 4.5
Industrial stock prices
(DowJones) —6.8 —6.9 8.3 3.9
Business incorporations —5.6 —4.6 4.4 2.5
Industrial production (rita) + 1.3 —1.9 4.4 1.8
Source: Table 56. There are eight peaks and seven troughs common to all of these
series in the period 1899—1949.
the trough in stock prices is reached first, followed by stock trading,
business incorporations, merger activity, industrial production,
and the reference cycle. The implication is that in prosperity,
merger activity tends to correspond most closely to capital market
conditions, while in depression it corresponds most closely to indus-
trial activity and general business conditions. This suggestion is
confirmed by the correlation between merger activity, stock prices,
and industrial production, presented later.
A simple ranking of turning points by order of occurrence alters
the sequence somewhat from that indicated by the average leads
in Table 57. As shown by Table 58, a simple average rank in order
of sequence places the peak in stock trading first, followed by busi-
ness incorporations, stock prices, merger activity, the reference
cycle, and industrial production. In both Tables 57 and 58,how-
ever, peaks in merger activity bear a closer timing relationship to
stock prices than to any other series. The sequence for cyclical
troughs is essentially the same whether based upon average lags
or upon average rank order of occurrence.
The merger series is directly compared in Table 59 to the three
specific economic series that revealed the closest timing relation-
ship to mergers in the reference cycle comparison—stock trading,
stock prices, and business incorporations. As the comparison shows,
all three series are closely related to the merger series at both peaks
and troughs, the average lag or lead in no instance being more than
2.9 months.
Merger activity exhibits the closest average lag or lead to stock
prices at peaks, and to business incorporations at troughs. Con-
114-
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TABLE 58
Sequence of Cyclical Turning Points in Merger Activity, Stock Prices, Stock Trading,








Point trading prices tions activityproduction cycle
Peaks:
6/99 1 5 3 4 6 2
9/02 1.5 3 1.5 4 6 5
5/07 2.5 2.5 4 1 6 5
1/10 1 2.5 2.5 5 6 4
8/18 1 2 3 4 5 6
1/20 1 2 3 6 5 4
6/29 6 5 1 2 4 3
5/37 1.5 4 3 1.5 6 5
Troughs
12/00 3 4 1 2 5 6
8/04 4 1 3 5.5 2 5.5
6/08 1.5 1.5 3 6 4 5
12/14 4.5 4.5 4.5 1 2 4.5
4/19 2 1 3 4 5 6
7/24 2.5 2.5 4 1 5.5 5.5
10/49 1 4 2 3 5.5 5.5
AVERAGE RANK
Peaks 1.9 3.3 2.6 3.4 5.5 4.3
Troughs 2.6 2.6 2.9 3.2 4.1 4.6
Source: Table 56.
TABLE 59
Timing of Cyclical Turning Points in Stock Trading, Stock Prices, and Business Incor-






of Leads and Lags
Peaks Troughs
Number of shares sold, NewYork
Stock Exchange —2.9 —2.4 5.4 5.5
Industrial stock prices (Dow Jones) + 0.9 —2.7 5.4 6.3
Business incorporations + 1.3 —0.4 6.2 5.8
Average —0.2 —1.8 5.7 5.9
Source: Table 56.
versely, the average deviation of lag or lead is greatest for incor-
porations at peaks, and for stock prices at troughs. Thus stock
prices appear to be the most consistent immediate factor at merger
peaks, while business incorporations are the most consistent
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immediate factor at merger troughs. Stock trading consistently
leads merger activity at both peaks and troughs.
The relationship of merger activity to the three economic series
is somewhat higher at peaks than at troughs. The over-all average
lag or lead of the three series is smaller at peaks than at troughs;
also, the over-all average deviation of lag or lead is slightly smaller
at peaks than at troughs. This suggests that mergers more closely
paralleled the indicated economic factors in times of high merger
activity than in times of low merger activity.
The coincidence of cyclical turning points, alone, cannot be
taken as conclusive evidence that capital market conditions are
the main immediate cause of increased merger activity. Coinci-
dence in timing may be as much an indication that merger activity
responded in the same manner to underlying economic conditions
as itis an indication that the capital market is the cause and
mergers are the effect. Whatever the causal connection, it seems
that the more significant developments are those associated with
merger peaks. As the greater dispersion of lags and leads at troughs
suggests, the influence of external economic changes in periods of
low merger activity is apt to be diffuse and erratic. Their influence
in periods of high merger activity, by contrast, is more consistent.
Accordingly the greater coincidence of merger peaks with those of
the capital market encourages us to look more closely into the
behavior of the capital market for clues to the causes of merger
revivals.
Correlation with Stock Prices and Industrial Production
Ideally, in bringing correlation analysis to bear, one would ex-
amine a variety of factors, each in detail and depth. Practically, it
was necessary to restrict the number of analyses, and we shall focus
on stock prices and industrial production—series suggested by pre-
vious tests as representative of two major types of merger-related
forces.
The stock price series was chosen, in preference to the series on
the volume of stock trading, as a more direct indicator of the con-
dition of the capital market. The movement of stock prices would
seem to be the less equivocal indicator of changes in investor
psychology, although both series exhibit high conformity to the
reference cycle (see Table 56). For example, it is possible to give
a more meaningful interpretation to a rising stock price index in
a period of constant trading activity than to a rising volume of
trading activity in a period of level stock prices.
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The index of industrial production was selected as an appro-
priate indicator of changes in the real level of industrial activity.
Short-run changes in the physical volume of output reflect changes
in employment and to some degree changes in the applications of
technology. The physical volume of industrial production also
directly affects the sectors of the economy to which the merger
series relate, whereas more comprehensive measures of real econo-
mic activity (e.g., deflated gross national product) would be less
directly applicable.
Quarterly series of stock prices and of industrial production were
computed from available monthly series (Chart 5); they are pre-
sented in Table C-7 with a brief description of the method of
computation. Their quarterly changes form the basis of correla-
tion analyses for the period 1895—1954.
The stock prices and industrial production series exhibit strong
and consistent upward secular trends over the sixty-year period.
To avoid "swamping" cyclical movements by trend the two series
were adjusted to remove the trend component. The remaining
cyclical component was taken as the ratio of the actual value to the
trend value for the given quarter. Exponential trends were fitted
by use of the least squares method. The underlying straight line
shape of the two series, as plotted on semi-logarithmic graphs,
indicated this to be a satisfactory form.
The merger series exhibited no clear trend. Indeed, the discon-
tinuous pattern of merger activity suggests that the concept of a
secular trend may be inapplicable to mergers. Mergers more
strongly reflected the absence than the presence of continuously
strong underlying forces, upon which the trend concept is based.
This is especially true for the upper stratum of the merger popu-
lation which our sample represents. We might expect a secularly
growing number of mergers of all sizes combined reflecting the
growth of the business population. However, it is not likely that
the explosive pattern of our series of large mergers is a faithful
reflection of the time pattern of mergers among smaller business
firms. Moreover, had we tried to specify a trend, the problem of
splicing the 1895—1920 and 1919—1954 series would have been for-
midable.7 Accordingly no trend-fitting was attempted. As the
measure of the "cyclical" pattern of mergers the ratio of the given
quarterly value to the average quarterly value for 1895—1920 (or
1919—1954) was used, in the belief that it would provide a satis-
factory series of cyclical variations, permitting comparable correla-
tion analyses through the sixty-year period.
On thissee Chapter2.
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The correlations between merger disappearances on the one hand
and stock prices and industrial production on the other are pre-
sented in Table 60. The correlation for the whole sixty-year period
TABLE 60
Simple and Partial Correlation Coefficients among Merger Activity, Stock Prices, and
Industrial Production, Quarterly Series of Cyclical Components, 1895—1920
Period andLengthofPeriod F12 r13 r12.3 p132
1895—1954 (60 years) +0.469+0.084+0.470+0.085+0.019
1895—1904 (10 years) +0.376+0.304+0.287+0.173+0.421
19O5—1918(I4years) +0.399+0.452+0.013+0.263+0.705
1919—1931 (13 years) +0.713+0.305+0.733+0.384+0.050
1932—1942 (11 years) —0.235 —0.124—0.230 —0.098+0.114
1943—1954 (12 years) +0.342 —0.144)+0.317+0.037 —0.496
= Cyclicalcomponent of merger disappearances series.
=Cyclicalcomponent of industrial stock price series.
X3= Cyclical component of industrial production series.
1895—1954 indicates that merger activity paralleled stock-price
changes to a much greater degree than it paralleled changes in
industrial production.8 Indeed, the correlation between mergers
S Tests of the significance of the departure of observed correlation coefficients from zero,
for the 5 per Cent and 1 per cent levels of significance, are here summarized:
Sper centlevelof significance I per cent level of significance
Period t1293 93.2 r129392.3 93.2
1895-1954 S N S N S N S N
1895-1904 S N N N N N N N
1905—19 18 S S N N S S N N
1919—1931 S S S S S N S S
1932-1942 N N N N N N N N
1943—1954 S N S N N N N N
SSignificant departure from zero.
N =Nota significant departure from zero.
In reviewing the stock price series, Sophie Sakowitz of the National Bureau discovered
that the splicing ratio used to lower the level of the pre-1914 series to that of the post-1914
series was incorrect. It should have been 0.756 instead of 0.709, as she explained:
"The ratio Nelson used was based on the overlapping period, January 1915—
December 1917. However the figures for November 1916 to December 1917 of the
second segment had already been raised to the level of the first segment by a ratio
based on the figures for October 1916, only. Unfortunately, October 1916 of the
first segment was estimated in such a way as to make it very dubious. Therefore all
figures based on the ratio using it are equally dubious. The procedure we should use
is to lower the segment 1895-1914 (twelve stocks) by the ratio of the following
segment (twenty stocks) by the ratio of the actual overlapping data for the period
December 1914 to September 1916. This ratio is 0.756."
The pre-1914 series, as corrected by her, is presented in Table C-7. The trend for stock
prices and the correlation measures involving stock-price data were not, however,
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and industrial production is low enough to raise doubts about the
existence of any short-run relationship at all. In part, the low cor-
relation can be attributed to differences in the timing of turning
points demonstrated in Tables 56 and 57, which record in another
way the lack of short-run parallelism between mergers and indus-
trial production.
The sixty2year period was divided into five subperiods, each at
least a decade long, chosen to compare the pattern of response in
periods of consistently high merger activity with that in periods
of consistently low activity. In periods of low activity we might
expect the factor most closely related to the large waves of mergers
to exhibit lower correlation with mergers than in periods of high
merger activity. As sharp bursts of activity reduce correlations in
high-merger periods, the shift between high- and low-activity
periods is best examined by comparison with the correlation of
the other merger-related variable.
As Table 59 indicates, mergers were more positively correlated
to stock-price changes than to changes in industrial production in
the three periods of high merger activity—1895-.1904, 1919—1931,
and 1943—1954. Conversely, in the two periods of low merger
activity,1905—1918 and 1932—1942, industrial production ex-
hibited a higher positive (or lesser negative) relationship to mergers
than stock prices did. This suggests that capital market conditions
or their underlying causes were of leading importance in periods
of high merger activity, and that their role in times of low merger
activity was not important. While industrial production was the
more important factor in times of low merger activity, the correla-
tions were so low that no strong cause-and-effect connection is sug-
gested.
Brief descriptions of each of the subperiods follow:
1895—1904
The relatively low correlations between mergers and both stock
prices and industrial production derive mainly from the difference
recomputed, since it is doubtful that the findings would be changed appreciably. The
increase of less than 7 per cent in the level of the pre-19l4 data would have a progressively
smaller effect on the trend values for the later part of the period. The effect for the period
1895-1914 would, of course, be small, as both the trend and the data would be altered in
approximately the same degree.
The Staigdard Statistics index of industrial production was used in the correlation
measures for the period 1895—1918, where it was spliced to the Federal Reserve Board
index. Subsequent investigation revealed that the Babson index of business conditions
was a somewhat better measure for this early period; it has been substituted for the above
measures in Table C-7 and in the turning point comparisons. Again, recalculation of the
correlation measures was avoided in the belief that the effects on the findings would not
justify the added time and expense.
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between the large bursts of merger activity in 1899 and 1901. The
1899 burst was characterized by the merger of many medium-sized
firms, while the 1901 burst was characterized by the merger of
fewer and larger firms. If the capitalization rather than the number
of firms had been the measure used, the merger series would have
paralleled more exactly the twin peaks in the production and stock
price series. This would have produced higher correlations.
The stock price—merger correlation is higher than the industrial
production—merger correlation principally because of the post-1901
time pattern. Industrial production continued to climb through
1902 and into 1903, while both merger activity and stock prices
declined steadily from 1901 to late 1903. This suggests that the
large merger wave ended not so much in response to an adverse
turn in the underlying level of production as to an adverse turn
in the condition of the stock market.
The sharp later stage of the decline in stock prices beginning in
early 1903 was popularly known as "the rich man's panic." As the
name implies, it represented the end of a bull market that had
become over-saturated with high-priced securities held largely by a
relatively few large investors and speculators. It reflected no serious
business depression comparable to that of 1907—1908. The huge
merger wave, it is true, exhausted merging opportunities in a num-
ber of important industries, and was slowing partly on that account.
At any rate, it seems likely that the collapse of the stock market
effectively foreclosed remaining merger opportunities, whether
many or few.
1905—19 18
This period was one of generally low merger activity, and of
closely parallel movements in stock prices and industrial produc-
tion. Perhaps doubly influenced by the reinforcing effects of the
two economic forces, merger activity exhibited a fairly high
response to their changes. This is reflected both in the timing com-
parisons made above, and in the moderate positive correlations
presented in Table 61,below. Had the merger series been
smoothed rather than used in its unsmoothed form, the correlations
would have been higher.
Merger activity diminished the sharp business recession of 1907—
1908, in which both industrial production and stock prices under-
went steep declines.It revived sharply during the recovery in
business conditions that reached its peak in 1910. The merger
series also closely followed the downward movements of production
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and stock prices in 1913 and 1914, and responded with equal sensi-
tivity to the 1914—1918 expansion.
Mergers exhibited no strong immediate response to the major
anti-trust Supreme Court decisions of 1911, by which the oil,
tobacco, and explosives monopolies were dissolved. The merger-
depressing effect of these decisions may have been offset by the
expansion of stock prices, stock trading, and industrial production
that characterized 1911. That the Court decisions may have exerted
some inhibiting effect on merger activity is suggested by the fact
that these expansions were part of the only set of cycles in these
series between 1899 and 1920 for which there was no corresponding
merger cycle. But that the Court decisions did not seriously dis-
courage mergers is suggested by the time pattern of merger activity.
The years 1911 and 1912 exhibited no sharp decline in merger
activity. Rather the decline was very gradual until the second
quarter of 1913, by which time declines in stock prices and indus-
trial production were well advanced. It was not until then that
merger activity dropped off sharply.
1919—1 9S 1
Merger activity increased along with the post-World War I
increase in stock prices and industrial production. it reached a
peak in 1920. in the same month as the peak in industrial produc-
tion, and four months after the peak stock-price month. Following
this peak, merger activity experienced a protracted three and one-
half year decline. This occurred despite the sharp though short
'cycle in both stock prices and industrial production that was regis-
tered in this period. No satisfactory explanation why mergers did
not exhibit a cycle comes to mind. The differences in time pattern
between the industrial production and stock prices cycles were so
small that comparisons were unconvincing. For what it is worth,
the stock price cycle was less sharp than the industrial production
cycle, and may have been small enough to have had little effect on
mergers.
From 1924 through 1929 stock prices increased greatly while
industrial production increased only moderately. The merger
series more closely followed stock prices. The cyclical component
of stock prices, measured as the ratio of the actual value of the series
to the trend, rose from a value of 0.90 in mid-1924 to 2.90 in mid-
1929, an increase of 193 per cent. In the same period the "cyclical"
component of merger disappearances rose from 0.87 to 4.10, an
increase of 370 per cent. The cyclical component of industrial
production rose from 0.94 to 1.26, an increase of only 28 per cent.
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In these five years, the period of the greatest revival of merger
activity since the turn of the century, the correlation between stock
prices and mergers was higher than at any time in merger history.
The correlation between mergers and industrial production was
much lower, the moderate increase in industrial production over
these five years exhibiting very little relation to the expansion of
merger activity.
Comparison of cycles in the three series also attests the impor-
tance of stock prices in the late 1920's merger wave. The National
Bureau did not designate a cycle in stock prices between 1923 and
1929; however there was a short, sharp peak in stock prices at the
end of 1925. This was accompanied by a peak in merger activity
in the second quarter of 1926. The corresponding peak in indus-
trial production was not reached until the third quarter of 1927,
and roughly coincided with a trough in merger activity.
Following the stock market crash of 1929, the three series
declined in roughly parallel fashion. The industrial production
series did not decline as sharply as mergers and stock prices; how-
ever, its decline was large and unbroken in the manner of the other
two. The time patterns of 1929—1932 probably should be regarded
as no more than a part of the large and protracted decline in
general business activity that dominated these years.
1932—1942
This eleven-year period was noted for the absence of merger
activity. It was not until 1942 that merger activity began to revive
in any substantial degree. As the correlation measures indicate
(Table 59), the response of mergers to the economic forces studied
was very small and, if anything, opposite to its response in the
three subperiods from 1895 to 1932. The negative correlations are
probably more a matter of statistical error than an indication of a
meaningful shift in the causal relationship. In this period of very
low merger activity we might expect the random appearance of
small burstsof merger activityto dominate the correlation
measures. This would make a negative and a positive correlation
equally probable.
The period can be divided into two parts, each containing
unique movements in stock prices and industrial production. The
first, spanning the years 1932—1938, is the period of substantial
though incomplete recovery from the deep depression of the early
1930's, followed by the sharp, short recession of 1937—1938. In this
period stock prices and industrial production were closely parallel.
mirroring the business recovery and recession. Merger activity did
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not respond to these changes with any degree of sensitivity, thus
supporting the hypothesis that a serious depression will produce an
ebb in merger activity unresponsive even to marked changes in the
specific factors related to it.
The second part of this period spans the years 1938—1942, in
which the economy underwent a strong protracted recovery to the
full and over-full employment levels of World War II. Stock prices
and industrial production took divergent courses, however. Stock
prices declined moderately and with fair regularity, while indus-
trial production increased markedly and with great regularity.
Merger activity remained constant, at the same low levels of 1932—
1938, exhibiting no clear tendency either to rise or fall. It was not
until the second quarter of 1942, when the stock price index turned
up, that merger activity began the protracted rise to its late-1945
peak. In 1942 business activity had apparently revived sufficiently
to enable mergers to respond to the stimulus of rising stock prices.
The 1937 revival had evidently not been great enough to do so.
1943—1954
The most recent of the five periods is marked by the restoration
of merger activity to a sustained level substantially above that of
1932—1942. In only one year, 1949, did the number of merger dis-
appearances fall below that of the most active year of 1932—1942.
The average annual number of disappearances for the period
1932—1942 was 125, while that for 1943—1954 was 289.
It is useful to divide the period 1943—1954 intO two parts. The
first part, 1943—1946, represents a continuation of the wartime
divergence in stock prices and industrial production begun in 1938.
In a division of merger history according to whether stock prices
and industrial production moved in parallel or divergent patterns,
the period 1939—1946 would stand out as the period of greatest
divergence. Merger activity remained generally low and unrespon-
sive to both stock prices and industrial production until 1942,
during a protracted three and one-half year rise in industrial pro-
duction and an equally protracted fall in stock prices. The 1942
revival of stock prices brought with it the revival of merger
activity, and both series began an expansion, which ended in late
1945 for mergers and in early 1946 for stock prices. From 1943 to
1946 both series ran opposite to the decline in industrial produc-
tion.
The second part of the period, 1947—1954. exhibited a more
normal relationship between stock prices and industrial produc-
tion. There was sufficient divergence between the two series,
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however, to permit contrasts in the response of merger activity.
From 1946 through 1949 mergers followed the small decline in
stock prices, running counter, for thirty-three months, to the 1946—
1948 rise in industrial production. Following the 1949 trough
mergers mirrored the rise in both stock prices and industrial pro-
duction until 1953. At that time mergers increased sharply, after
the manner of stock prices.
1955—1956
Although no quarterly merger series for 1955 and 1956 were
available at the time of writing, rough annual comparisons can be
made (Table 61). These comparisons indicate that recent merger
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Merger disappearances for 1954 are from Report on Corporate Mergers and Acquisitions,
Federal Trade Commission, May 1955. For 1955 and 1956, frompress releases dated
June 18, 1956 and February 14, 1957.
Industrial stock prices: arithmetic average of Dow Jones monthly index published in
Surziej of Current Business, February 1955, 1956, and 1957.
Industrial production index: from the Federal Reserve Bulletin, February 1957.
activity corresponded more closely to changes in stock prices than
to changes in industrial production. While crude, this finding is
Consistent with that of the analysis of the quarterly movements in
the sixty-year merger history.
Interpretation
Comparison of cyclical turning points indicated that peaks of
merger activity were more nearly simultaneous with peaks in stock
prices and stock trading, while they led peaks in the reference cycle
and industrial production. Merger troughs, on the other hand,
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showed greater simultaneity with troughs in reference cycles and
industrial production, and lagged the troughs of the capital markets
series. The indicated greater correlation of mergers with stock
prices in periods of high merger activity and of mergers with
industrial production in periods of low merger activity may thus
have been caused partly by this shift in time sequence. Other things
being equal, the correlation of two series with simultaneous turn-
ing points will be greater than that of two series with a consistent
lead or lag in turning points.
To reduce the bias from this source the subperiods were selected
so that each would encompass an integral number of complete
cycles in as many of the series as possible. The five periods into
which the sixty-year merger history was divided were each suffi-
ciently long to encompass several peaks and troughs (Table 62).
TABLE 62












1895—1904 2 3 2 3 2 3
1905—1918 3 3 4 4 4 3
1919—1931 2 1 3 2 4 4
1932—1942 0 1 3 4 1 2
1943—1954 1 1 2 2 2 2
No means are at hand for knowing the precise effect of these
systematic shifts in timing on the correlation measures, nor the
extent to which the selection of subperiods reached this bias, if at
all.
The time sequence and the correlation analyses presented above
tend to confirm the hypothesis that merger activity was more
responsive to economic forces underlying changes in the capital
market than to those underlying changes in the level of produc-
tion. That hypothesis was further confirmed by a detailed examin-
ation of short-run changes in mergers and in the two series
analyzed, which indicated that the statistical timing and correla-
tion measures were reasonably accurate indicators of the response
of mergers to the two kinds of economic change.
The findings do not conclusively demonstrate, however, that
underlying industrial factors were not an ultimate factor in merger
behavior. It is possible that merger movements represent a burst
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of industrial reorganization toward which underlying economic
and technological developments have been accumulating a long
time. A favorable capital market may, under these circumstances,
trigger the massive reorganization. Thus, while the findings of the
study may have demonstrated clearly the importance of the capital
market as a proximate factor in merger movements, they have not
so clearly demonstrated its importance as an ultimate cause.
In certain cases it is probably correct to regard the long-run
secular trend in an economic series as independent of its short-run
cyclical variation. When the cycles are short and relatively small
in amplitude, they may be taken as largely "surface phenomena,"
having no significant effect on underlying growth factors. However,
when the series is marked by the infrequent appearance of large
bursts of activity, these "cycles" dominate the time pattern and
may make inappropriate the concept of gradual underlying forces
of change. As infrequent large bursts of activity are likely to be
the effect of the equally infrequent appearance of certain short-
lived conditions, the cumulative total of activity may be different
from that which would result from the smoothing out of the time
patterns.
As has been documented in this study, the time series of mergers
was characterized by large bursts of activity separated by lengthy
intervals of very low activity. Therefore it cannot be claimed that
the cumulative amount of merger activity would have been the
same if the merger series had behaved like a more normal cycles-on-
trend series; nor can it be determined from our data whether the
cumulative amount would have been larger or smaller. What does
seem certain is that merger activity would have been a good deal
less colorful had it followed a more normal time pattern.
The frenzied construction of industrial empires during the large
merger waves and their sometimes painful in the
readjustment periods that have followed may or may not have had
important effects on the structure and performance of our indus-
trial system. The task in this chapter has been to describe merger
patterns and to suggest possible avenues to follow in exploring these
questions. The important and interesting job of providing answers
remains to be done.
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